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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

THE LEGAL RELATIONS OF CITY AND STATE WITH
REFERENCE TO PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
By

HAROLD

F. Kumm*

I
INTRODUCTION

A

s suggested by the title, this paper is to deal with some questions concerning the relation of municipality and state
which arise in connection with the state control of public utilities.
These problems are a natural outgrowth of the present widespread system of regulation by state public service commissions.
The rapid development of this country, and the rise of large
cities, have given a great stimulus to the growth of urlian utilities.
Among the most important of these are gas plants, electric light
and power systems, water-works and street railways. No comment is needed to show the dependence of city dwellers on these
industries or the importance of low rates and good service. There
are involved other interests as well, sometimes conflicting. The
state at large is interested in the maintenance of property rights
and the people's welfare, the company in receiving a fair return
on its investment, the municipal corporation in the following of
that policy which will contribute most to the growth and prosperity of the city. That these interests make some sort of control
necessary is fully recognized; but there is a difference of opinion
as to the method to be employed, whether control should be by
franchise, or by local regulation without franchise, or by a state
public service commission. Municipal ownership has also been
proposed and in many cases adopted, as a solution of the problem.
In connection with these questions of policy come legal questions
*Instructor, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
This article is adapted from a thesis of the same title which received
the First Prize in the Harris Political Science Contest for 1921. The
Harris Prizes, established by Mr. N. W. Harris of Chicago and the gift of
Professor N. D. Harris of Evanston, Illinois, are designed to encourage
a more thorough study of all questions relating to public morals, federal
and state administration, and municipal government and party politics.
The contest is open to undergraduates of all universities and colleges in
Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa.
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of equal importance. Since an understanding of both law and
policy is necessary to a full understanding of the subject it shall
be our object first to outline the problems of policy, and to follow
this by a more detailed discussion of the legal questions involved,
though neither subject can be adequately considered in a paper of
this length.
Although different forms of regulation have been witnessed at
various periods in our history, the American doctrine of regulation has remained little changed. This fundamental doctrine is
that the public is entitled to reasonable service at a reasonable rate,
and it has never been so interpreted by the courts as to permit the
company to charge all that the traffic would carry." Bearing this
principle in mind, we are ready to examine the attempted control
of public utilities by means of franchise provisions.
Under a system of franchise control, the fixing of rates is
either the sole and deliberate act of some such group as the state
legislature, the city, or the public utility; or it is a contractual
agreement between two of the parties. Where the rates are fixed
solely by municipality or utility, they cannot be strictly fair to the
other party. One personally interested in the outcome must inevitably be prejudiced in his own favor. However honest the intention to act fairly, one's own interests will always loom larger
in the mind than the interests of the other party and consequently
the other party cannot consider the rate so fixed to be just.
Nor is the likelihood of reasonableness much improved when
the charge is fixed by contract between two of the groups. The
relation here is contractual and it arises out of a political struggle
rather than out of a judicial determination. The representatives
of the contracting groups do not meet as impartial judges to be
guided by a standard that is above both parties, a standard which
must be declared independent of conflicting personal interests. Instead, as would be expected in a contractual relation, the interests
are foremost and the object of each party to the agreement is to
gain the utmost for the group he represents. The council, acting
in behalf of the city, must necessarily be guided by political considerations. The councilmen have not been chosen by the city to
act as impartial outsiders in dealing with the utility. More
probably they have been chosen in a heated campaign in which the
franchise question has achieved prominence through appeals to
'William Anderson, Local Control of Public Utilities, (an unpublished
manuscript) 1914, p. 2.
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passion, prejudice, and self-interest, rather than through an appeal
to reasonableness; a campaign in which the highly technical but
important questions of valuation, etc., could have but little consideration. Then the public utility, moved to self-defense, attempts
to control the council through favors. Once started in this practice, self-interest prompts it to go beyond a merely reasonable rate,
and to try to get all it can. The utility is no more competent to
determine reasonableness than the city. But whether the city or
company control the council the result is essentially a compromise
contract in which politics, self-interest and the relative strength of
the parties play a greater part than reasonableness. We must look
to some other system than this to find a rate fair to public and
company alike.
It might be argued that although political control is defective,
such defects as exist can be remedied by the courts which under
this system are open to the injured party. For although the
primary control be political, the ultimate decision in case of appeal
lies with the courts. It might be said that the judges are well
fitted to handle the questions of public utility control. But let us
take the question of rates. In a given case the court can merely
say whether the contested rate is or is not reasonable, according to
law; and no common standard of reasonableness has as yet been
adopted. Even if the court after long drawn-out litigation decides
that the charge in question is not reasonable, the proper rate is
still undetermined. The court has not the power to fix what it
considers a reasonable rate since that power is legislative or administrative rather than judicial.2 Further, the highly technical
2

Freund, Police Power, 1904, Sec. 304-5. Among other cases Freund
notes State v. Johnson, (1900) 61 Kan. 803, 60 Pac. 1068 in which a legislative act attempted to set up a court of visitation. The Supreme Court of
the state declared the law unconstitutional as violating the principle of
separation of powers since the proposed court had not only judicial
powers but the power to fix rates, which the court held to be a legislative
function.
In some recent cases the courts have in practice ignored this defect of
power. Thus in a federal case the court declared that although the direct
power of the courts in rate making was negative and not affirmative, the
courts might nevertheless while acting within their judicial power grant an
injunction against the enforcement of unreasonable rates, and condition
the grant upon the acceptance by the plaintiff of a rate which the court
regards as reasonable. City of Toledo v. Toledo Ry. and Light Co.,
(1919) 259 Fed. 450, 458. The judge made the rate in practice though not
in theory.
Some courts directly declare that they have not the power to fix rates.
City of New York v. Bronx Gas and Electric Co., (1920) 113 Misc. Rep.
166, 184 N. Y. Supp. 658, 660. But see contra Municipal Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, (1919) 225 N. Y. 89, 121 N. E. 772; Morrell v.
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questions involved in utility regulation demand that the persons
settling these questions be trained not only in law, but in the
valuation and control of public utilities as well. A judge can became a technical expert only by neglecting the remaining field of
law. This he is not likely to do. To the extent then that the
judge lacks the necessary technical training we may even say that
the courts are unfitted for settling ultimately questions of regulation. And finally, the law's delays are such that the city may suffer irreparable injury or the company be forced into bankruptcy
before a decision is finally handed down. Where the contest drags
over several years, the decision may easily be obsolete by the time
it is rendered. Thus the courts not only fail to remedy the evils
of political control, but add the disadvantages of the delays of
justice, the lack of the necessary knowledge; and sporadic rather
than continuing supervision over the public service company.
To meet these evils and furnish speedy justice through the
means of an impartial, competent tribunal the commission idea was
brought forward for the control of public utilities. This control
might take various forms so far as the different states were concerned; that is, there might be exclusive local control, or exclusive
state control, or a division of regulatory powers between city
and state.
A few words might be said at this point as to exclusive control
by a local commission. Assuming the city to have been given the
power of regulation, the final legislative control must remain with
the council, since legislative power once delegated cannot be
further delegated. 3 We are here considering a locally established
commission subordinate to the city council, which that body is free
to follow or not as it pleases. In such case the final decision must
still remain in the field of politics, and be subject to the grave objection already pointed out. That this is true is amply demonstratBrooklyn Borough Gas Co., (1920) 113 Misc. Rep. 65, 184 N. Y. Supp. 651.
In the latter at page 655 the court says: "It seems to me error to take the
position that a court may determine that a gas rate is too low to be fair to
the corporation and is too high to be fair to the consumer, yet has no
power to determine the rate that will be fair to both." However, on appeal
the court's fixing of the rate was held to be error. Morrell v. Brooklyn
Gas Co., (1921) 231 N. Y. 398, 132 N. E. 129.
Borough
3
The general principle that the legislature cannot delegate its power to
any other body has an exception in the case of municipal corporations, and

the general view is that a grant of power to municipal corporations for
certain purposes is not unconstitutional on the ground of delegation of
powers. 6 R. C. L. 168-9. Sec. 168. But this power cannot be further
delegated by the municipality.
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ed by the history of the St. Louis commission. 4 Even where a
local body may be set up independent of the council, politics will
still creep in, though to a lesser extent; for those selected from
that locality will naturally overestimate the interests of those who
elect them. Were it possible to get unbiased commissioners, local
control would still be subject to the criticism that the average city
cannot afford to get the men best fitted for the task, nor conduct
the extensive and costly investigation necessary to a proper
decision. For these reasons it would appear that exclusive control
in the hands of a local commission cannot be as satisfactory, from
the standpoint of intelligent and impartial regulation, as exclusive
state control.
Adequate control of utilities by state commissions began in
1907 when both New York and Wisconsin created public service
commissions. Since these bodies were given wide regulatory
powers, their work was followed throughout the country with
much interest. That the state commission idea has since found
rapidly increasing favor is evidenced by a study of state legislation during the next few years. By the end of 1910 five states had
adopted this type of control. 5 That it had come to stay was shown
by the results of 1911 when nine states established public commissions ;6 and in no state was any legislation passed lessening the
powers of existing commissions.7 During 1912 the idea grew
steadily as experience strengthened the conviction that state control was greatly superior to local control in handling the involved
questions connected with the control of public utilities." The next
year, 1913, found forty-two states holding legislative sessions, in
seventeen of which the governors urged the passage of public
9
service commission laws or the strengthening of existing laws.
4William Anderson, Local Control of Public Utilities, (an unpublished
manuscript) 1914, pp. 39-44. In a footnote to p. 40, Professor Anderson
refers to the following for information concerning the St. Louis Commission: (a) King, the Regulation of Municipal Utilities, 1912, ch. XIII,
(an article by Roger N. Baldwin, secretary of the Local Civic League).;
(c)

Report

(b)

Wilcox, -Municipal Franchises, 1911, 750-754;

(d)

Report . . . in the United Railways Company . . .;

.

.

. in

Rates for Electric Light and Power (cover title), St. Louis, 1911, pp. 172;

St. Louis,

vol. I, 1912, pp. 382 plus; vol. II, 1913, pp. 34 and tables; (e) Report ...
on the Southwestern Telegraph and Telephone Company . . . (cover
title); St. Louis, 1913, p. IV, 152.
5Georgia, Maryland, New York, Vermont and Wisconsin.
OCalifornia, Connecticut, Kansas, Nevada, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon and Washington.
7R. C. Harrison in American Year Book of 1911, p. 446.
8
R. C. Harrison in American Year Book of 1912, p. 280.
9
R. C. Harrison in American Year Book of 1913, p. 294.
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Ten states adopted the commission idea in this year. 10 1914 did
not see the establishment of any new commissions. The year following, 1915, was again a year in which most of the state legislatures met, and a year in which public sentiment could be tested.
But though in most of the states not having commissions bills were
introduced for their establishment, only one new state was added
to the list." In some states the powers of the commission were
slightly added to, in others proposals to add to the commission's
powers were defeated.' 2 By 1917 the regulation of public utilities
by state commissions had become almost universal throughout the
country. There still continued to be much objection to the part
that political considerations played in the selection and reappointment of commissioners. The companies by this time had modified
their earlier attitude of hostility toward all regulation, and now
favored the commission idea as the greatest barrier against municipal ownership.' The agitation for state control had given added
strength to the home-rule sentiment, and in such organizations as
the Minnesota Home Rule League this sentiment actively combated the further extension of state authority. During the war the
interest in this subject was naturally lessened by the more stirring
events of the great conflict. But the high operating costs then and
the continued high prices since have forced the commissions in
many instances to grant increased rates, and the commissions have
consequently lost popularity. Within the last year added interest
has been given to this subject in Minnesota by the adoption of a
statute which places street railways under the control of the state
4
Railroad and Warehouse Commission.1
At the present time the state commission idea seems to be
firmly established. But though it appears that state control of
public utilities is more desirable than exclusive local control, it is
quite possible that the best results can be gained by a division of
powers. Under such a division, we would give to the state control
over those matters which are of statewide importance and to the
'oColorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Montana, Pennsylvania and West Virginia.

"W'yoming.
12R. C. Harrison in American Year Book of 1915, p. 297.
13R. C. Harrison in American Year Book of 1917, p. 272. Mr. Harrison is4 a former member of the New York Public Service Commission.
1 Laws 1921, ch. 278. Under this act the street railways in Minneapolis,
St. Paul and Duluth applied for an increase in rates which the commission
granted. But the charging of these higher rates was blocked by temporary
injunctions issued by the district courts of the districts in which these cities
lie. Thus the courts are presented with the problems here discussed.
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city control over those which are essentially local. This may lead
to some friction somewhat similar to that which exists between
state and nation over the control of commerce, but at the same
time the benefits of such a division would seem to outweigh its
disadvantages. The extent of the control that can be granted the
city varies of course with geographical conditions and the degree
of home rule the cities enjoy. Generally, the more isolated the
communities the more power they may properly have; and the
greater the local self-government the greater the power they may
be given. Bearing these considerations in mind, we may say,
speaking generally, that the powers of regulation can be divided
into three classes :15
(1) Those of a state-wide character, to be exercised exclusively by the state.
(2) Those of an essentially local character, to be exercised exclusively by the municipality.
(3) Those of a mixed character, to be exercised primarily by
the city, but subject to revision by the state commission.
The control in the first class of powers is vested in the state
commission. This must be so since the problems which these
powers must meet are so state-wide in their character, and their
control is so necessarily uniform throughout the commonwealth
that they can be properly exercised only by a body having a
jurisdiction as wide as the problem to be met. Failure of the
state to act within this field should not be so construed as to permit local regulation. Rather, it should be taken as an indication
of an intent on the part of the higher authority that the field is to
be left uncontrolled. As to the powers that can be properly
handled by the state, a few may be enumerated. The subject of
incorporation is a vital one in public utility control. Power over
incorporation is ordinarily in the hands of the state, and the state
commission might properly be given control over the issuance of
stock, the general powers and duties of corporations, and intercorporate relations. In the latter, especially where there is extensive
interlocking control, the cities are powerless to remedy conditions.
l'5The classification here presented cannot be referred to any one work,
but the writer has examined the following authorities as to the division of
regulatory powers between city and state: (a) 2 Wilcox, Municipal
Franchises, 1911, 744-5; (b) A. L. Valentine, Address on Public Utilities
reported in the Municipal League News (Seattle), April 27, 1912, p. 2;
(c) J. M. Eshlemen, 2 Nat. Mun. Rev., Jan. 1913, pp. 24-30; (d) H. E.
Wilson, Seattle Mun. Rev., Dec. 13, 1913, pp. 1-2, 5; (e) Report of Commission 3 Nat. Mun. Rev., Jan. 1914, pp. 13-27.
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Other powers which the state commission should have by reason of
its greater impartiality or wider knowledge are the right to fix
rates, depreciation standards, and uniform accounting systems, and
to make rules for valuation for the purposes of rate-making, capitalization, condemnation or purchase. Thus the state is to determine the settlement of those problems which are state-wide, or
which the state by reason of its fuller knowledge and more
judicial attitude can handle more justly than the city.
The second class of powers, a limited one, consists of those to
be vested exclusively in the city. There are certain minor matters
which the locality should have the right to regulate, even though
its control be essentially political. In respect to some things
essentially local in their nature the state commission would have
neither the time nor the interest which is necessary for proper
regulation. Exclusive local control would probably be most complete in the case of street railways. There it might properly be
extended to questions of stops, schedules, re-routing of cars, and
service. In the case of gas, telephone and electric companies, the
city's control would be confined more or less to the question of
service, although it might also include such matters as the placing
of poles, etc.
There still remains the third class. This covers a broad field
and includes such elements as the assignment of streets upon which
railways or mains may be laid, orders for extensions of existing
lines, and the granting of permits. The direction in which a city
will build is determined in large measure by the direction in which
street car lines or water mains are extended. Unless the community have some control over these matters, city planning is impossible. Questions of such importance, affecting so vitally the
future of the locality should be left primarily to it, for after
all the public utilities exist for the city and not the city for the
public utilities. But that the utility may be protected against
abuses of power, against attempts to build up outlying "speculation districts" at the expense of the company or other localities,
there should be a right of appeal to the state commission. In case
of appeal the higher body should content itself primarily with a
determination of whether or not the regulation complained of is
unreasonable; and not alter the city's finding without good cause.
By allowing the municipality to make its own agreements in the
field indicated above, the interest of the people in municipal affairs
is maintained while the state prevents shortsighted action by its
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power of review. Thus the best of both is kept; the particular
needs of the people in any community will insure their attention
and continued interest in the matter of regulation while the state
will bring in that equality and impartiality which can only be obtained by a highly trained body unmoved by local self-interest1
This concludes our discussion of the questions of policy. We
now turn to the corresponding legal problems. These are many
and include such questions as to the protection to be given municipal corporations and private persons by the national and state constitutions through the contract clause, the due process clause, and
the like; questions as to the delegation of powers; and as to the
nature of the powers given the commission, whether legislative,
administrative or judicial; the problems of franchises and franchise rights; and finally the whole question of what is a public
use. In a paper of this length but few of these problems can be
considered. Certain constitutional questions concerning the relation of city and state have been selected as being of the greatest
interest, and it shall be our object to inquire so far as space will
permit into the following:
(1) To what extent is a municipal corporation, in its ownership of public utilities, protected against the state public service
commission by the contract and due process clauses of the federal
constitution ?
(2) To what extent is the state's police power, when acting
through a public service commission, hampered by franchises
granted prior to the establishment of the commission?
16
The writer is fully aware of the fact that the state commissions have
not yet reached this ideal condition. But there is in the state commission
idea the possibility of progress toward such an end; whereas there can be
no progress under the old system where the decision rests on the strength
of the parties dnd where the question is one for political agitation rather
than law. It is probable that while this new set of rules and law is in the
making, political considerations will at times be given weight. No doubt
the same was true when the common law was in the making, and the same
is true today in those branches of international law which are still in a
fluid state. But in spite of this present defect, the commission idea points
the way toward a body of precedent which, when fully developed, it
will be the province of the commission to enforce as thoroughly as the
courts now enforce the common law. When such a state has been reached,
an elected commissioner must necessarily be as impartial and aloof from
politics as an elected judge. It is no extravagant assertion to say that
when such a time comes, the commissioners will honor their established
precedent as much as the courts do theirs, and follow it with as great
fidelity.

CITY V. STATE UNDER UTILITY REGULATION
II
ON

THE

PROTECTION

AFFORDS

WHICH

THE MUNICIPAL

THE

FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION

CORPORATION AGAINST

THE STATE

It is necessary briefly to inquire into the nature of municipal
corporations, in order to determine what protection, if any, the
federal constitution may give them against the state in their own-

ership of public utilities.' 7 It is apparent that if there are bounds
beyond which the legislature cannot go in its dealings with the
municipality, its creature, the public service commission, is likewise limited. Added importance is given this question by the
large number of utilities which are municipally owned.
Before the state commission idea was adopted as a remedy, the
inability of the city to settle the problems of regulation through the
medium of political and judicial control had given great impetus
to the movement for municipal ownership. This movement was
especially noticeable in the period from about 1890 to 1907, and
resulted in many cities becoming the owners of water plants,
electric light and gas plants, etc. Municipal ownership was
adopted as the only means by which the public could adequately
safeguard its interests.' 8 This condition of affairs complicates our
problem of state control, for the commission will be forced in many
instances to deal with utilities owned by the city. To examine the
constitutional principles governing the relations between city and
state where the utilities are so owned is the main object of this
article.
In this country municipal corporations, like private corporations, must be created by statute.' 9 It might be thought that inasmuch as they are the creation of the legislature for the purposes
of government, the legislature as the higher governing body
should be supreme over them at all times and in all things. If this
view ever was held in an unqualified form it has been modified in
this country by the recognition of the private or proprietary
capacity of cities. The municipality has been held to be acting in
this capacity in the maintenance and operation of a water works
17A municipal corporation is defined by Dillon as "the body corporate
and politic constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or
town for the purposes of local government thereof." Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., 58.
18C. L. King, The Regulation of Municipal Utilities, 1912, p. 26.
1-91 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, p. 61.
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system,20 gas plant,2 electric light plant,2 2 market house, 2 wharf, 2
and cemetery ;2 and in the negligent operation of such business has
been held to a liability corresponding to that of a private individual
engaged in a like enterprise. With the idea of a private capacity
and its corresponding liabilities, there appeared a principle of protection. The principle was this: that the city, acting in such
capacity, was entitled to receive protection as against the state
similar to that given the private corporation or individual engaged
in a similar undertaking.26 This conception of a proprietary
capacity was the result of "judicial legislation" 27 which aimed to
escape technical difficulties and do substantial justice.28 The
principle so evolved is now clearly established, 2 but there is still a
very real difficulty in its application. 0 For the creators of this
principle did not mark clearly the boundaries of such proprietary
capacity, nor did they indicate the basis upon -xvhich it was founded.
Indeed, it would have been difficult to do so, for while from the
viewpoint of the individual all municipal acts are public, yet from
the viewpoint of the people at large many acts are not public in
the sense that the whole state is politically interested. With no
sound basis then for the distinction between the two capacities,
governmental and proprietary, it is not surprising that succeeding
cases show much confusion. But this confusion must not be
erroneously interpreted as a denial of the principle but as a denial
of its applicability to the particular facts presented by the case.
It is interesting to note in this connection certain federal cases.
While these relate to state rather than municipal activities the distinction between proprietary and governmental acts is clearly
brought out. In Bank of the United States v. Planter's Bank of
20

See cases cited in footnote 57, post.
cases cited in footnote 59, post.
cases cited in footnote 58, post.
cases cited in footnote 60, post.
cases cited in footnote 61, post.
cases cited in footnote 62, post.
A fundamental distinction, however, between private and municipal
corporations exists in the power of the legislature to deprive the municipal
corporation of its charter and thus of its corporate capacity to hold property. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 4th ed., 290.
27"I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but
they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular action." Holmes, J., in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, (1916) 244
U. S. 205, at 221, 61 L. Ed. 1086, 37 S. C. R. 524.
281 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 184; David v. Portland Water Committee, (1886) 14 Ore. 98, 12 Pac. 174.
291 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 184.
201 Rose's Notes on United States Reports, p. 979.
22See
22
See
2
3See
24
See
2
See
26
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Georgia,31 the defendant numbered among its stockholders the
state of Georgia. On this account it claimed immunity from suit
in any but the highest federal court. This claim was denied by
Chief Justice Marshall who said :32
"It is, we think, a sound principle that when a government
becomes a partner in any trading company it divests itself so
far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign
character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it
descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and
takes the character which belongs to its associates and to the business which is to be transacted."
This case was quoted with approval in Briscoe v. The Bank of
Kentucky33 where the state had chartered a bank which was to be
exclusively the property of the commonwealth. After quotations
from previous cases, the court declared:
"They show that a state, when it becomes a stockholder in a
bank, imparts none of its attitudes of sovereignty to the institution, and that this is equally the case, whether it own a whole
or a part of the stock of the bank." 4
Finally, in the South Carolina Dispensary Case,35 where the
state had engaged in the sale of intoxicating liquors, a federal tax
on such state business was upheld by the United States Supreme
Court. While recognizing that certain state agencies are immune
from taxation, the court insisted that such immunity does not extend to those agencies "which are used by the state in the carrying
on of an ordinary private business."36 An analogy is drawn between state and city while acting in a private capacity and the
opinion contains several quotations from state cases in which the
proprietary capacities of a municipal corporation are discussed.
Regarding it as an established principle that the municipal corporation is entitled to some degree of protection against the state
where the corporation is engaged in a proprietary undertaking, it
will be our object to define the limits of that protection.
As to the city in its public or governmental capacity, a few
words may be said. It is to be observed that from the viewpoint
3

Bank of the United States v. Planter's Bank of Georgia, (1824)

Wheat. (U.S.) 904, 6 L. Ed. 244.
3-Ibid., p. 907-8.
928.

9

33Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, (1837) 11 Pet. (U.S.) 257, 9 L. Ed. 709,

3UIbid., pp. 325-6.
35South Carolina v. United States, (1905) 199 U. S. 437, 50 L. Ed. 261,
26 S. C. R. 110.
3GIbid., p. 461.
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of the state the community has been incorporated for a political or
governmental purpose, to assist the state in the government of its
local subdivisions.3 7 The legislative act is in effect the setting-up
of a lesser legislature to exercise a portion of the governing
powers of the state in the government of that particular locality.
There is nothing of commerce about the transaction;
it is essentially political. Nor can it be said t h a t
by such act a contract has been set up which is protected against
subsequent impairment by state act, for it is elementary that to
make a valid contract requires the assent of both parties. 38 But incorporation requires the assent of one party only, the governing
body of the state. Its act is binding without the assent of the corporators, unless the act is expressly made conditional.3" It is incorrect, therefore, to consider the grant of purely governmental
powers a contract within the sense of that clause of the federal
constitution which prohibits any state from passing a law impairing the obligation of contracts. 40 If the city is acting merely as a
local or lesser legislature, must it not necessarily be subordinate to
the greater legislature in all political questions on which the greater
acts? Were it otherwise, were we to permit rights of local government to become vested as against the state, we should have within
the commonwealth a number of petty governments, created by the
legislature to assist it in expressing the political will of the state,
but now beyond its control.41 Such purely governmental functions
42
cannot become vested as against the state.
Connected with the absence of constitutional protection while
the city is engaged in a public capacity is freedom from liability
for the negligence of its employees while so acting.43 Consequently
371
3

Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 58.

SThere are of course other reasons than this to account for the fact
that in respect to governmental functions no contract exists between city
and state. The point is given here by way of illustration, rather than as
proof.
3 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 142.
40"No state shall . . . pass . . . law impairing the obligation of
contracts."
Art. 1, Sec. 10, The constitution of the United States.
41

Sloane v. State, (1847) 8 Black. (Ind.) 361, at 364.
Dillon, Municipal Corporations, p. 178; Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 4th ed. p. 232; People v. Morris, (1835) 13 Wend. (New
York)
325, at 331; Sloane v. State, (1847) 8 Black. (Ind.) 361, at 364.
43
See cases cited below in footnotes 44 to 51 inclusive. "The liability
of cities for not keeping streets in repair would seem to be an exception to
this general rule, which we think the courts would do better to rest either
upon special considerations of public policy or upon the doctrine of stare
421

decisis than to attempt to find some strictly legal principle to justify the

decision." Mitchell, J., in Snider v. City of St. Paul, (1892) 51 Minn. 466,
472, 53 N. W. 763, 18 L. R. A. 151.
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it has been held that the municipality is not liable for damages resulting from its inability to put out a fire where such inability was
the result of negligently permitting the city water mains to become
dogged with sand or mud, 44 or the water system to get out of repair,4" and that there was no, liability on the part of the city for
the negligent operation of its fire department,46 police department,4 health department and hospitals,48 public schools, 4 jails and
workhouses,50 or ambulances," whereby damages were sustained.
Hence the municipality acting as the political agent of the state
has neither responsibility for its negligent acts in such capacity,
nor the privileges of protection against the state legislature. The
legislature may alter, abolish or modify the municipal corporation
at will; its power unlimited save by its own state constitution. 2
When we turn to a consideration of the city's acts in a proprietary capacity we find that there the city has both responsibilities and
privileges. Its rights and liabilities while so acting may be said
to resemble those of a private person engaged in similar enterprises. But inasmuch as the creation of this capacity in American
law is the result of "judicial legislation" as noted above, it is evident that the limits set in this field will vary in the different jurisdictions, and result in much confusion. We may, however, lay
down the general rule that in the construction and operation of
water works,5 3 gas plants5 4 and electric light plants, 55 the city is
44
Miller v. City of Minneapolis, (1898) 75 Minn. 131, 77 N. W. 788.
Canty J., at 75 Minn. 133 says, "For purposes of protection from fire, the
water45 plant and service must be regarded as part of the fire department."
Springfield Fire Ins. Co. v. Village of Keeseville, (1895) 148 N. Y.
146, 46
42 N. E. 405, 30 L..R. A. 660, 51 A. S. R. 667.
Hillstrom v. St. Paul, (1916) 134 Minn. 45, 159 N. W. 1076, L. R. A.
1917B 548; and notes in 30 A. S. R. 398; 108 A. S. R. 170; 15 L. R. A.
781; 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 666; 4 L. R. A. (N.S.) 629; 44 L. R. A. (N.S.) 68;
7 Ann.
Cas. 807; 18 Ann. Cas. 508; 45 L. Ed. 314.
47
Cleveland v. Payne, (1905) 72 Ohio St. 347, 74 N. E. 177, 70 L. R. A.
841.
48
Evans v. Kankakee, (1907) 231 Ili. 223, 83 N. E. 223, 13 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 1190 and note; Richmond v. Long, (1867) 17 Gratt. (Va.) 375, 94
Am. 4 Dec. 461 and note.
Ernst v. West Covington, (1903) 116 Ky. 850, 76 S. W. 1089, 105 A.
S. R. 241 and note, 3 Ann. Cas. 882 and note. 63 L. R. A. 652; Wahrman v.
Bd. of Education, (1907) 187 N. Y. 331, 80 N. E. 192, 116 A. S. R. 609
and note, 10 Ann. Cas. 405.
r°Nichols v. Fountain, (1914) 165 N. C. 166, 80 S. E. 1059, Ann. Cas.
1915C
152 and note, 52 L. R. A. (N.S.) 942 and note.
5
"Maxmilian, Admx. v. Mayor of New York, (1875) 62 N. Y. 160, 20
Am. Rep. 468.
521 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 142, 182.
5
3See cases cited in footnote 57, post.
"4 See cases cited in footnote 59, post.
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acting in a proprietary capacity. It is to be observed that although
the object here is public, it is not recognized as governmental so
far as the state at large is concerned. It cannot matter to the
state as a whole whether gas light is furnished to private individuals in a particular locality by the city or private corporation. Whatever interest the state may have is a commercial or
neighborhood interest. The aim is not governmental but commercial. The city has entered a field ordinarily occupied by private
enterprise and is operating a plant and selling service to consumers
after the manner of a private corporation. We may well ask:
"Should it be permitted to carry into this quasi-private enterprise the attributes of sovereignty and stand immune from actions
for negligence in the operation of such enterprises, or be free
from federal taxation? Should sovereignty protect that which
is not necessary to the government of the community?"56
Justice to those who have dealings with the city in such capacity would declare the enterprise entitled to no such protection.
If we deny the city in its private enterprises immunity from
suit, we may hold it liable for the negligence of its servants in such
undertakings. Accordingly, the city has been held liable for the
negligent construction of its water works system, electric light5"
55

See cases cited in footnote 58, post.
In a recent case the California supreme court decided that a municipally owned electric light plant did not come within the terms of a statute
which permitted the State Railroad Commission to regulate public utilities.
Pasadena v. R. R. Commission, (Cal. 1920) 192 Pac. 25, 10 A. L. R. 1425
annotated. The statute in this case classed as public utilities, among other
industries, every private corporation engaged in the production, etc. of
light for the public. The court said that a plant owned by a municipal
corporation was not owned by a private corporation within the meaning of
the act.
56
Exemption from liability for the negligence of its officers while
acting in a governmental capacity has been extended to the municipal
corporation upon various grounds. In Murray v. Omaha, (1902) 66 Neb.
279 the city was held not to be liable for the negligence of certain building inspectors since the board represented the state and exercised its
sovereignty. In Levy v. Mayor, etc., of New York, (1848) 1 Sand. (N.Y.
Sup. Ct.) 465 multiplicity of suits was mentioned as a basis for denying
recovery for damages resulting from the failure to enforce a law since
"there would be no end to the claims against the city and state" if such
actions were permitted. Whether the city profited or not by the undertaking seemed to be a vital point in the case of Hill v. Boston (1871) 122
Mass. 344 where the city was held not liable for the defective conditions
of its public school whereby a child was injured.
51
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 1912, 182; Winona v. Botzet,
(1909) 169 Fed. 321, 94 C. C. A. 563, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 204 and note;
Watson v. Needham, (1894) 161 Mass. 404, 37 N. E. 204, 24 L. R. A.
287; Pettingill v. Yonkers, (1889) 116 N. Y. 558, 22 N. E. 1095, 15 A. S. R.
442 and note; Brown v. Salt Lake City, (1908) 33 Utah 222, 93 Pac. 570,
126 A. S. R. 828 and note, 14 Ann. Cas. 1004 and note, 14 L. R. A. (N.S.)
619.
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and gas plant, 59 market houses,"0 wharves 61 and cemeteries.6 2 But
as we have noted, the development of this liability has generally
carried with it corresponding privileges. The extent to which
these privileges protect the municipality against the acts of the
state brings us to the main question of this article. For in its
operation of public utilities the city acts in a private capacity and
any protection afforded it by the federal constitution must to that
extent hamper the powers of the public service commission. Attention already has been called to that section of the constitution
which declares that "No state shall pass any law impairing the
obligation of contracts," and we may also note at this point the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.63 We are thus confronted with this question:
"Is the protection which the constitution affords private persons against state acts, extended as completely to a municipal corporation which is acting in a proprietary capacity ?"
This point has never been directly adjudicated in the United
States Supreme Court, although it often has noted the distinction
between the two capacities. Story, J., in the celebrated Dartmouth
College Case said:
"It may be admitted that corporations for mere public government, such as towns,. cities, and counties, may in many respects be subject to legislative control. But it will hardly be contended, that even in respect to such corporations the legislative
at its will, take away the
power is so transcendant that it may,
64
corporation."
the
of
private property
In a more recent case the court remarks:
"It has been held that as to the latter class of property [that
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Davoust v. Alameda, (1906) 149 Cal. 69, 84 Pac. 760, 9 Ann. Cas.

847, 5 L. R. A. (N.S.) 536 and note; Hodgins v. Bay City, (1909) 156
Mich. 687, 121 N. W. 274, 132 A. S. R. 546 and note; Riley v. Independence,59(1914) 258 Mo. 671, 167 S. W. 1022, Ann. Cas. 1915 D. 748 and note.
Brantman v. Canby, (1912) 119 Minn. 396, 138 N. W. 671, 43 L. R.
A. (N.S.) 862 and note.
6oSavannah v. Collins, (1868) 38 Ga. 334, 95 Am. Dec. 398 and note;
Barron v. Detroit, (1893) 94 Mich. 601, 54 N. W. 273, 34 A. S. R. 366
19 L. R. A. 452 and note.
and note,
6
'Jefferson v. Louisville, etc., Ferry Co., (1866) 27 Ind. 100, 89 Am.
Dec. 495; Willey v. Alleghany City, (1888) 118 Pa. St. 490, 12 At. 453, 4
A. S.62 R. 608.
Hollman v. Plattville, (1898) 101 Wis. 94, 76 N. W. 1119, 70 A. S. R.
899 and note.
63"No state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of
contracts." Art. 1, Sec. 10, the constitution of the United States. "Nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." Amendment XIV to the United States constitution.
64Dartmouth College v. Woodward, (1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, 694,
4 L. Ed. 629.
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held by the city in a proprietary capacity] the legislature is not
omnipotent. If the distinction is recognized it suggests the question whether property of a municipal corporation owned in its
private or proprietary capacity may be taken from it against its
will and without compensation. Mr. Dillon says truly that this
question has never been directly adjudicated in this court. But
it and the distinction upon which it is based have several timeE
been noticed." 65
It would appear that the court has not committed itself irrevocably on the question. We cannot say that it has either
recognized or denied the municipal corporation protection in a
proprietary capacity.66
We must turn then to the state cases for what light they may
shed upon the problem. In view of the wide use of the contract
clause in other fields it is surprising that we find so few cases
where it has been directly presented in a contest between city and
state. There are many dicta on the point, but few adjudications.
However, these few cases clearly recognize a principle of protection.
Perhaps the earliest case deserving attention, though not directly in point, is that of Benson v. New York.6 7 There the state
legislature had passed an act relating to ferries which it was
claimed deprived the city of New York of property rights in certain ferries which it operated by ancient grant. The court after
pointing out that by the doctrine of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, a grant of franchise when acted upon became a contract,
declared that the principles of that case were equally applicable
to all franchises coupled with a pecuniary interest. If this statute
must then be so construed as to include existing ferries, it must be
pronounced unconstitutional and void. The court, however, de65
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, (1907) 207 U. S. 161, 179, 52 L. Ed.
151, 28 S. C. R. 40. The court here refers to Commissioners v. Lucas,
(1876) 93 U. S. 108, 115. 23 L. Ed. 822; Meriwether v. Garett, (1880)
102 U. S. 472, 518, 530, 26 L. Ed. 197; Essex Board v. Skinkle, (1890)
140 U. S. 334, 342, 35 L. Ed. 446; New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co., (1891) 142 U. S. 79, 91, 35 L. Ed. 943, 12 S. C. R. 142; Covington v. Kentucky, (1898) 173 U. S. 231, 240, 43 L. Ed. 679, 19 S. C. R.
383; Worcester v. Street Ry. Co., (1904) 196 U. S. 539, 551, 49 L. Ed.
591, 25 S. C. R. 327; Monterey v. Jacks, (1906) 203 U. S. 360, 51 L. Ed.
27 S. C. R. 67.
220, 66
1n San Antonio v. San Antonio Public Service Co., (1921) 41 S. C. R.
428, where the Texas constitution prohibited the granting of irrevocable
privileges, the United States supreme court held that since the city
was not bound by the ordinance provision for street car rates the
courts would not construe such ordinance provision as binding on the
so as to permit the city to claim a contract right in such a rate.
company,
67
Benson v. New York (1850) 10 Barb. (N.Y.) 223.
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cided that the act did not include the city's ferries and so there
was no necessity for declaring it void.6"
What appears to be the first case directly in point arose in Wisconsin in 1860.69 This was an action of ejectment to recover
forty acres of land which plaintiff town had formerly purchased,
and which later by legislative act was included in the extended
city limits of the defendant. If the legislature is supreme over all
city property the plaintiff could have no valid claim here. But its
claim was upheld since the property was held in a private capacity.
Dixon, Chief Justice, says in this case:
"The difficulty about the question is to distinguish between
the corporation as a civil institution or delegation of merely political power and as an ideal being endowed with the capacity to
acquire and hold property for corporate or other purposes. In
its political or governmental capacity, it is liable at any time to
be changed, modified or destroyed by the legislature; but in its
capacity of owner of property, designed for its own, or the exclusive use and benefit of its inhabitants, its vested rights of
property are no more the subject of legislative interference and
control without the consent of the corporators than those of a
merely private corporation or person. .

.

. In its character of

owner of property, it is a private corporation,
' 70 possessing the
same rights, duties and privileges as any other.
The grant of land to the plaintiff was held a contract entitled
to the protection given by the federal constitution.
The next year the California supreme court decided the case of
Grogan v. San Francisco.71 -Here the city had attempted to sell
certain of its wharf property but irregularities rendered the sale
invalid. The state then attempted to ratify the sale. Whether its
act was sufficient to pass title to the property in question depended
on whether it had absolute control over the city's property. The
court held that it did not and said through Chief Justice Field,
"Nor is there any difference in the inviolability of a contract
between a grant of property to an individual and a like grant to
a municipal corporation. So far as municipal corporations are
68Cooley points out that this case would not be supported by the weight
of authority. Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., p. 292 note. This attitude appears to be based upon the belief that ferries are not properly
subject to being held in a proprietary capacity by a municipality. This
is rather a denial of the applicability of the principle than a denial of the
principle itself. It should be noted that the conditions in this case are
peculiar,
by reason of the antiquity of the ferry grants.
69
Town of Milwaukee v. City of Milwaukee, (1860) 12 Wis. 103.
0
7 Ibid., pp. 111-2.
7'Grogan v. San Francisco, (1861) 18 Cal. 590.
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invested with subordinate legislative powers for local purposes
they are mere instrumentalities of the state. . . . But though
a municipal corporation is the creature of the legislature, yet
when the state enters into a contract with it, the subordinate relation ceases, and that equality arises which exists between all
contracting parties. And however great the control of the legislature over the corporation, it can be exercised only in subordination to the principle which secures the inviolability of contracts." 2
The state's attempt to deprive the city of its wharf property
was held unconstitutional, as impairing the obligation of contracts.
In Spaulding v. Andover 3 this provision of the federal
constitution again was successfully invoked to protect municipal
property against state interference. The state of New Hampshire
had issued bonds for the reimbursement of expenditures, incurred
by various cities during the Civil War. A portion of them were
assigned to the city of Andover. Subsequently, the state legislature attempted to assign to private individuals certain of the bonds
still held by the city. The original grant was held a contract and
the later act of the state was held to be invalid as impairing the
obligation of contracts.
A decision a few years later by the Louisiana supreme court
is of more than ordinary interest, since some preceding decisions
of that court often have been cited in support of the contention
that the city can receive no constitutional protection in a proprietary capacity. In this case New Orleans had been given the
right by the state legislature to build docks and charge wharfage.
It later leased these to the plaintiff. Subsequently a statute
exempted from the payment of fees vessels of over a certain tonnage, built in the state. The defendant, owner of such a vessel,
refused to pay plaintiff the customary fees and this action was
brought. The court held the later act unconstitutional and in its
opinion through Manning, Ch. J., declared:
"The exclusive right to regulate and make improvements to
the wharves, and to lease them, having been thus lawfully conferred upon and delegated to the city, it became the private right
of the corporation and not subject to divestiture without a due
legal process and compensation therefor, as contradistinguished
from a public right which may be abrogated by the state at its
pleasure.""
72Ibid., pp. 613-4.
73Spaulding
v. Andover, (1873) 54 N. H. 38.
74Ellerman v. McMains, (1878) 30 La. Ann. 190, 31 A. S. R. 218.
75Ibid.

p.

191.
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While the case does not state whether the decision is based on
the contract or due process clause, it is probably upon the former,
since the court quotes with approval an extract from Cooley
which speaks of contracts arising in favor of cities, which cannot
be divested. The fact that a private person is the plaintiff here,
rather than the city, should not affect the decision, since the lessee
can have no greater rights than the lessor, the city of New
Orleans."6
The last case to be noted, and perhaps the most able, is that by
the Massachusetts supreme judicial court in Mouit Hope Cewtery v. Boston.7 7 The city of Boston owned a cemetery which the

legislature by statute attempted to transfer to a corporation entitled "The Proprietors of Mount Hope Cemetery." The act
made no provision for compensation to the city. The court distinguishing the governmental and proprietary capacities of a city,
declared that here the municipality had not acted strictly
"for the accomplishment of general public or political purposes,
but rather with special reference to the benefit of its own inhabitants. .

.

. In view of all these considerations, the con-

clusion to which we have come is that the cemetery falls within
the class of property which the city owns in its private or proprietary character, as a private corporation might own it, and
that its ownership is protected under the constitution of Massachusetts and of the United States so that the legislature
has no
''
power to require its transfer without compensation.

78

The decision in this case was placed upon the due process clause
of the federal constitution rather than upon that clause relating
to contracts. But for practical purposes it makes little difference
upon what ground the protection is based, so long as it is actually
extended.
Since, however, what is a proprietary character varies with
the varying "judicial legislation" as before noted, cases will be
found in which rights proprietary in one jurisdiction will be held
governmental in another, and protection denied. But that is not
6

L. H. McBain says of this case, "The case of Ellerman v. McMains
may also be excluded. The New Orleans charter of 1836 conferred upon
the city power to construct wharves and to collect wharfage. In 1874
the legislature passed an act exempting from the payment of such charges
boats built within the state. This act was held to be void, but no mention was made of the contract clause, the court declaring that the act
operated to deprive the city of property without due process of law." 3
Nat. Mun. Rev. p. 293, footnote.
77Mount Hope Cemetery v. Boston, (1893) 158 Mass. 509, 33 N. E.
695, 35 A. S. R. 515.
78Ibid., p. 519.
7
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a denial of the principle, but rather a denial of its applicability to
the facts under consideration. That municipal corporations have
a dual character must be regarded as firmly established.7 9 And as
to the protection to be afforded the city in a proprietary capacity,
the weight of authority would seem to incline toward a considerable degree of protection, though as to this the law cannot be regarded as definitely settled. 80 We should note at this point H. L.
McBain's opinion to the contrary, as expressed in an article on the
"Rights of Municipal Corporations under the Contract Clause of
the Federal Constitution.""' In this article Mr. McBain comes to
the conclusion that the federal constitution affords the city no
protection in a proprietary capacity. He is considering the contract clause only. In a support of his conclusion he cites St. Louis
v. Shields 2 (a wharf case), Layton v. New Orleans"3 (a tax case),
Police Jury v. Shreveport84 (a ferry), City of Laredo v. Martin85
(a ferry), Trustees v. Tatum (a ferry),8 6 Board of Education v.
Aberdeen5 7 (a case in which the legislature had changed the uses
to which money received by the city for liquor licenses should be
devoted), and People v. Vanderbilt"8 (in which there is discussed
the question as to the right of the state to establish a bulkhead
without regard to a previous grant of waterfront property to the
city). It will be noted that these cases all relate to borderline
rights, rights which the courts when they were building up the
doctrine of a proprietary capacity could either include or exclude
from that category. That they have chosen to exclude in the
above cases the particular rights there considered would not seem
to be sufficient to prove that they would have denied protection
if held in a proprietary capacity. That the courts were here concerned with the applicability of the principle rather than with its
denial is shown by the fact that other decisions of these same
791 Dillon, Municipal Corporations 184. "As to municipal powers and
rights held by the corporation in its proprietary or private character and
as to contracts made with reference thereto, it is to be regarded nearly
if not quite as a private corporation and is within the constitutional protection." 12 Corpus Juris p. 1004.
801 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, pp. 186-7.
8
sPrinted
in 3 Nat. Mun. Rev. 284.
8
2St. Louis v. Shields, (1873) 52 Mo. 351.
3
S
Layton v. New Orleans, (1857) 12 La. Ann. 515.
84
Police Jury v. Shreveport, (1850) 5 La. Ann. 661.
8
5City of Laredo v. Martin, (1880) 52 Tex. 548.
8
86Trustees

v. Tatum, (1851) 13 Il. 27.
7Board of Education v. Aberdeen, (1879) 56 Miss. 518.
SSPeople v. Vanderbilt, (1863) 26 N. Y. 287.
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courts are often cited as showing the recognition of a proprietary
capacity, and the right to a degree of protection for enterprises
undertaken in that character. Thus McBain's second and third
cases are from Louisiana. But we have already noted a more recent case from that state in which the principle of protection is
clearly recognized.8 9 His fourth case is one from Texas. A
later case from that state is often cited as supporting the principle
of protection to rights held in a proprietary capacity. 90 The fifth
decision is by the Illinois supreme court. The case of Richland
County v. Lawrence County91 from that state is frequently cited as
showing the right to protection in a proprietary capacity. It is
true that the additional Texas and Illinois cases to which we have
called attention relate to counties rather than cities, but it would
seem that the courts would recognize proprietary rights even less
readily in the case of a county than in the case of a compact municipal organization. Mr. McBain's seventh citation is of a New
York case but we have already noted the statements in Benson v.
New York.

9 2

Approaching these cases from another angle we may note that
three are ferry cases: one relates to taxation, and one to the use
to which money derived from liquor licenses is to be put. Is there
anything inconsistent in the reasoning which regards these rights
as public? The United States Supreme Court in the Hartford
Bridge Case9" spoke of a ferry as "being virtually a highway
across the river, over another highway up and down the river."
If such a view be followed, it is quite logical to exclude ferries
from that class of enterprises which the city may engage in in a
proprietary capacity. Nor should the fact that the court chose to
regard arrangements for taxation and liquor licensing as the exercise of a governmental function lead to the conclusion that in
all cases they will refuse to recognize a dual character, and a de8909E~lerman v. McMains, (1878) 30 La. Ann. 190, 31 A. S. R. 218.

Milam County v. Bateman, (1880) 54 Texas 153.
91Richland County v. Lawrence County, (1850) 12 Ill. 1, 8 the court
says, "That the state may make a contract with, or grant to, a public
municipal corporation, which it could not subsequently impair or reserve,
is not denied; but in such a case the corporation is to be regarded as a
private company. A grant may be made to a public corporation for purposes of private advantage; and although the public may also derive a
common benefit therefrom, yet the corporation stands on the same footing
as respects such grant, as would any body or person upon whom like
privileges
were conferred."
92
Benson v. New York, (1850) 10 Barb. (N.Y.) 223, discussed p. 48
supra.
93
East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., (1850) 10 How. 511, 534, 13 L.
Ed. 518.
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gree of protection in the proprietary undertakings. In other
words, it seems that these cases are concerned more with the
applicability of the principle than with its assertion or denial.
Another point which Mr. McBain notes is the matter of free
water for cities and he believes that this right ought to be proprietary if any right is. But it is to be observed that the water is
to be used mainly, if not wholly, for governmental purposes, that
is, for the sprinkling of the streets and the prevention of fire. And
even if it were a proprietary right, the state in the exercise of its
police power could require the city to pay for water used as the
state can require any private consumer to pay for water used as
will be brought out more fully in the next subdivision.
Our conclusion as to the protection to be given the city may be
then summed up to this effect: that numerous dicta, certain learned
commentators, and several adjudications, which appear to represent the weight of authority, unite in declaring that the protection
which the federal constitution affords a city while acting in a
proprietary capacity approaches that extended to a private individual or corporation engaged in a like enterprise.
(To be conchided.)

